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Warsaw Uprising of 1944: A Touchstone in
United States and Russian Relations
By: Jordan Szczygiel

Warsaw Uprising Stirs Tension, Eventually Leading to the Cold War
On August 1, 1944, when the Armia Krajowa [AK] comprised of Polish
partisans, took to the streets against the Germans, the only question in their minds
was when Warsaw was going to be liberated. Instead of a quick victory, fighting
raged on for sixty-three days ending with the eventual defeat of the AK. Even
though the uprising failed to free Warsaw from the grasp of the Nazis, it did become
a touchstone in the relationship between two superpowers, the United States and
the Soviet Union.
Russia’s actions during the course of the rising led many Americans, in
particular William Averell Harriman, United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union,
to express grave concern over future interactions. Russian officials had continually
refused to provide assistance both directly and indirectly to the partisans until it
was too late. The Soviets justified their inaction by saying that the Poles had not
coordinated with the Red Army. Roosevelt believed it was not in the Western allies’
interest to pressure Stalin for fear of losing a necessary ally. He also worried about
negative publicity affecting his November re-election chances. President Roosevelt
refused to challenge Stalin over the Polish issue. Consequently, the Soviet Union
played the dominant role in the reconstruction of Poland’s government up until
Truman stepped in as president following Roosevelt’s death.
Poland had a long-standing history of fighting for freedom, from the days of
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, when the country’s citizens challenged kings,

up to the twenty-first century. 1 Consequently, it came as no surprise when the
Union of Polish Patriots summoned Warsaw to take up arms against the Nazis on
July 29, 1944 at eight-fifteen in the evening on the Kosciusko Radio Station, out of
Moscow.
“For Warsaw, which did not yield but fought on, the hour of
action has now arrived. The Germans will no doubt try to
defend themselves in Warsaw, and add new destruction and
more thousands of victims. Our houses and parks, our bridges
and railway stations, our factories and our public buildings will
be turned into defense positions. They expose the city to ruin
and its inhabitants to death… It is therefore a hundred times
more necessary than ever to remember that in the flood of
Hitlerite destruction all is lost that is not saved by active effort;
that by direct, active struggle in streets of Warsaw, in its
houses, factories and stores, we not only hasten the moment of
final liberation but also save the nation’s prosperity and the
lives of our brethren. Poles the time of liberation is at hand:
Poles, to arms! There is not a moment to lose!”2

Following that broadcast, the resistance fighters lay in wait. Having already
received permission from the exiled Polish Government in London, General Tadeusz
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Bór-Komorowski, commander in chief of the Home Army, decided that the uprising
would be launched on August 1, 1944. The exact reason of why that particular day
was chosen to launch the uprising may never be known, but Jan Jankowski, Delegate
and Vice-Prime Minister of Polish Government, provided some insight to the
explanation during a radio broadcast on 1 September.
“There were several reasons for our uprising. We
wanted to repel by force of arms the last blow the Germans
were preparing to deal at the moment of their departure to all
that were still living in Poland; we wanted to thwart them in
their aim of revenge on insurgent Warsaw. We wanted to
show the world that although we wanted to have an
independent Poland, we were not prepared to accept this gift
of freedom from anyone if it meant accepting conditions
contrary to the interests, traditions and dignity of our nation.
Finally, we want to free Poland from the nightmare of the
Gestapo punishments, murder and prisons.
We want to be free and to owe this freedom to nobody
but ourselves.”3
The combination of Jankowski’s analysis along with other Polish leaders, such as
Bór-Komorowski and Propaganda Bureau Colonel Jan Rzepecki, led many to
speculate that the uprising began primarily for political and ideological reasons.4
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On the morning and into the early afternoon of 31 July, military and political
leaders involved with the orchestration of the resistance were not planning on
deploying troops the following day.5 However, that all changed during the course of
an afternoon meeting between Generals Bór-Komorowski, Pelcynski, Okulicki and
Major ‘H.K.’, as a German military radio station transmitted a segment explaining
how the Russians were attacking Warsaw from the southeast.6 At the same time,
Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, Prime Minister for the Polish government in exile, was in
Moscow. Mikolajczyk had gone to see Stalin with the hope of returning SovietPolish relations to a firm status, and in the process hopefully “clarifying the political
atmosphere between the Allies in this decisive stage of the war.”7 General BórKomorowski feared that Stalin would be able to strong-arm Mikolajczyk into an
unfavorable settlement if the Soviets took Warsaw without the Armia Krajowa,
Polish resistance forces, playing a major role.
Having heard about the Russian attack on Warsaw from the southeast, the
“Home Army Generals assumed that the imminent entry of the Russians into the city
was a foregone conclusion,” especially considering how much they stood to gain,
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militarily and politically. 8 Poland served as a corridor for Germany to attack Russia;
therefore Stalin wanted an alliance between Poland and Russia in an attempt to
prevent Poland from falling victim to Germany yet again. Russia hoped that Poland
would “have a government which understood and valued good relations with its
Eastern neighbor and that would be willing to preserve these relations in the
interests of the struggle with our common enemy, Germany.”9 Stalin sought an
independent state that was friendly to Russia. Poland could handle its own internal
affairs. If the Red Army liberated Warsaw from the Nazis, the Russians could paint
themselves as the “redeemers of the Polish capital”, giving them political leverage to
set up the government that they desired.10
In September 1943, Russians had coordinated with the Home Army to form a
plan of action known as “the Tempest.” The strategy called for the rebellion of the
Home Army in local areas as the Red Army approached, consequently providing the
Red Army additional support as it rid cities of the common foe, the Germans.11 On
13 July, Vilna witnessed the success of “Tempest,” and then on 26 July, the city of
Lvov observed a similar triumph. The past successes of “Tempest,” in addition to
what the Russians stood to gain from liberating Warsaw, led Poles to believe that
the Russians would undoubtedly attempt to gain control of the capital. Thus,
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Colonel Bokszcznin expressed the common feeling among Poles, that the uprising
would be a success, when he stated that “the course and outcome of the projected
battle did not arouse the slightest feeling of apprehension, no one talked about it,
and many considered it already won.”12
This, however, proved not to be the case because the Russians did not cross
the Vistula until months later. Military officials and politicians still debate the
reason for the delay. A significant amount of evidence points to military reasons
though. On 5 July, Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, told Harriman
that the intention was to have the armies in Byelorussia strike Königsberg in East
Prussia and then continue southwest into northern Poland.13 The city would be left
for General Zygmunt Berling, commander of the first Polish Army, which fought
under the USSR, and the Polish partisans. Since the Red Army was not able to make
it to Königsberg or northern Poland in early August, the Germans, charged with
defending the capital, sustained uninterrupted radio communication with the west.
Faced with an opposition that could call in reinforcements, the Russians realized
that they were too spread out to stand a chance.
“The 48th and 65th Armies were still over 60 miles away
from Warsaw, the right wing had only just reached the Narew
river, the 70th Army was engaged in taking control of Brześć
and the 47th Army was fighting at Siedlce; only lead elements of
the 2nd Tank Army were approaching Praga. In the second
12

Ciechanowski, Warsaw Rising of 1944, 246.

13

Harriman, Special Envoy, 336-337.

place, the two bridgeheads over the Vistula at Magnuszów and
Puławy, to the south of Warsaw, held by the 8th Guards and
69th Armies and the 1st Polish Army, were temporary subjected
to a strong counterattack by German forces.”14
General Chruściel, having received faulty information that Soviet tanks were in
Praga, gave his support for the uprising to begin on the 1 August. Had General
Chruściel known the true status of the Soviet forces, who knows if he would have
submitted his approval? The uprising in Warsaw could have aided the Red Army in
its effort to take the capital, just as the uprisings had provided assistance to the
liberation efforts in Vilna and Lvov. However, due to the time of the rising, its
chances of successively liberating the city were drastically lowered. Harriman later
recalled:
“I think Stalin would have crossed the Vistula without any
thought of how it would affect the London Poles – if he felt
strong enough to overcome the German defenses. The
Germans had brought in three more divisions to reinforce the
garrison troops already in or near Warsaw. The Red Army had
advanced so far and so fast it had run ahead of its supplies.
The Russians had no boats or bridges ready. It was all
improvisation. They discovered that getting across the Vistula,
five to six hundred yards wide at Warsaw, would take a lot
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more stuff than they had, and Stalin was unwilling to admit
it.”15
As the uprising commenced, partisans filled with pride and thoughts of success took
their positions around the city. General Bór-Komorowski had assembled 35,000 to
40,000 individuals armed with only light weapons and a limited amount of
ammunition, medicine, and food. At five in the evening during Warsaw rush hour,
the Armia Krajowa sprang into action. The rationale behind the starting time was
that rush hour would provide a distraction. Colonel Antoni Chruściel, Commander of
the armed forces in Warsaw, also hoped the earlier start time would give him
additional time to reorganize his men as well as combine his gains during the
night.16 The disadvantage to the “w” hour was that it split the city up into sections
and in the process cut off many people from their homes and loved ones. This
forced Polish officials to deal with a number of homeless people and children
separated from their parents. Not deterred by these challenges or the deaths of
civilians who had been caught in the crossfire, citizens of Warsaw greeted the
uprising with delight and eagerness, especially in light of the fact that the Germans
had brought in two divisions in preparation for a new massacre of the population.17
Individuals of all ages and both sexes, wanting to contribute in any manner they
could, began constructing barricades out of baths, barrels, buckets, and
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miscellaneous other things. By eight p.m., on 1 August, the Polish flag was flying
from the Prudential building, the highest building in Warsaw. 18 This initial success
infused the capital’s citizens with enthusiasm and a belief that the uprising marked
the end of the war.
This triumph and zeal continued through the first few days of the uprising.
On 2 August, after General Bór-Komorowski had successfully re-established radio
communication with London, he informed the Polish government in exile of the
sequence of events from the previous day. Having established communication with
Poles abroad, Bór-Komorowski set up an Information Bulletin that would serve to
keep the Poles informed as to what was occurring. The first Bulletin included
instructions from the Civilian Commissioner pertaining to the treatment of German
soldiers and German property. “On 3 August, the insurgents captured their first
German tank; they repaired it and drove it into action against its former owners.”19
On 4/5 August, the first sign of assistance came in the form of a Royal Air Force
bomber over Warsaw. For the capital’s citizens, this initial form of assistance
signified that the city was liberated for the first time in over five years. This new
found “freedom” did not come without a price. Over 2,000 people were killed in the
first few days of the uprising.20
Since Mikolajczyk was already in Moscow in the initial days of the uprising,
he met with Stalin on 4 August. Initially, Stalin belittled the Poles but then
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proceeded to explain that partisan activity was valuable. Nevertheless, by no means
was he interested in mobilizing his army to provide assistance to the movement
because he thought that the “Poles had risen up against the Germans prematurely.”
21 22

Stalin also refused to let Great Britain and the United States provide aid.

According to Harriman, Stalin wanted it understood that the Poles had acted
independently and if the Germans defeated them the Russians had nothing to do
with it.23
Unlike the Russians who wanted no part of the uprising, the Germans looked
upon it with a barbarian type of joy as they were now justified in liquidating the city.
Heinrich Himmler, Minister of the Interior who oversaw the “Final Solution” and the
forced labor system, declared: “Warsaw will be liquidated; and this city, which is
the intellectual capital of a sixteen-to-seventeen-million-strong nation that has
blocked our path to the east for seven hundred years will cease to exist.” 24 25 On 5
August SS – Ogruf. Erich von dem Bach arrived in Warsaw; his arrival marked a
change in the course of the uprising.26 Bach brought in his own men, which when
combined with the forces that were already there created the dedicated Attack
Group. The Attack Group, taking Himmler’s response to heart, were fixated on
21
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massacring everyone in their sight, sparing no one; “Estimates of their noncombatant victims in the suburbs of Ohota and Vola vary from 20,000 to 50,000.”27
Despite the group’s ability to follow Himmler’s orders, Bach was not satisfied
because of their minimal progress at crushing the rising. Accordingly, Bach set up a
transit camp ten miles outside the city with a special task force, Einsatzkommandos,
to carry out the executions, and allowing the Attack Group to concentrate on Armia
Krajowa. Refocused on the partisans, Bach’s troops cut through the center of the
city to the Vistula effectively dividing Bór-Komorowski’s troops in two.
As the Germans directed their attention towards crushing the uprising,
Polish Political leaders, especially Mikolajczyk, were found in back rooms consulting
with the Russians. The Poles, in pursuit of a favorable make-up of the Polish
Government were working against the clock as the Russians did not appear to be
coming to their aid against the superior German forces anytime soon. The time
crunch also stemmed from the fact that the Poles wanted to hammer out a deal
while they still had “political leverage” from the uprising. Concurrently, Polish
officials enjoyed additional clout as Russian officials wanted to work things out with
the Poles because they understood that the United Nations was looking upon the
issue as an indication of future Soviet foreign policy.28 The leverage was necessary
if Polish officials had any hope of altering the stance of Russian official on PolishRussian issues. George Kennan, deputy chief of the U.S. mission in Moscow,
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proposed that since Stalin relied heavily on his advisors, all of whom lacked the
knowledge of foreign statesmen, Russia utilized a rigid foreign policy, where it
refused to associate with any foreign powers except on Russia’s own terms.29
Harriman confirmed Kennan’s belief as he explained how in the months preceding
the start of the uprising, Stalin and Molotov were unwilling to recognize the exiled
Polish Government located in London “as long as it included the named individuals
who rightly or wrongly were considered irreconcilably antagonistic to friendship
with the Soviet Union.”30 For the Russians to consider mediation, Mikolajczyk
would need to include individuals from the new Committee of Liberation.
Mikolajczyk would have no part of the demands, calling those in consideration for
inclusion questionable individuals. The two sides were not able to reach an
agreement, and Mikolajczyk was “still worried that the majority of members of the
Committee of Liberation were determined to communize Poland.” Nevertheless,
Mikolajczyk went back to London feeling content, due to the frank discussions and
the promise of future aid from the Red Army.31
The future seemed promising for the Poles. They had recently obtained a
pledge of assistance from the Reds. This was in addition to the supposed support
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that the British had promised in the Polish-United Kingdom Treaty of Mutual
Assistance signed on August 25, 1939. Article 1 in the Agreement is as follows:
Should one of the Contracting Parties become engaged
in hostilities with a European Power in consequence of
aggression by the latter against that Contracting Party, the
other Contracting Party will at once give the Contracting Party
engaged in hostilities all the support and assistance in its
power.32
Under the Article, the United Kingdom was clearly obliged to the Polish Government
but nowhere in the treaty were partisans mentioned, so consequently, the British
were not required to come to their aid. On August 12, 1944, General Kazimierz
Sosnkowski, Polish Commander-in-Chief, asked the allies for the assistance of the
Polish Paratroop Brigade, which fell under their command.33 Aware that the British
were not compelled to do anything, Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General
Staff and Chairman of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, responded to General
Soskowski’s request by saying that the English lacked the “necessary transport
aircraft to fly in a unit and maintain it in Warsaw.”34
The British did not completely abandon the resistance fighters, however,
they allowed the Polish special duties air crews in Bari, Italy to airdrop supplies to
32
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their comrades.35 In total, the Poles carried out ninety-seven flights in August,
eighty of which were to Warsaw. Unfortunately, seven crews were lost.36 Sir John
Slessor, British, Commander-in-Chief RAF Mediterranean and Middle East explained
the difficulties:
It was one thing to drop supplies to pre-arranged
dropping-zones marked by light signals in open country…It
was quite another to bring a big aircraft down to a thousand
feet…over a great city, itself the scene of a desperate battle and
consequently a mass of fires and flashes from guns and
bursting shells…and ringed by light AA [anti-aircraft]
weapons.37
Due to the barrage of anti-aircraft fire, the 1586th Polish Special Duties Squadron
lost 16 crews in flights to Warsaw.38 As a result of their high mortality rate and low
degree of success, these trips were deemed suicidal missions. Subsequently, Sir John
Slessor, British, Commander-in-Chief RAF Mediterranean and Middle East, halted
them. Sir Slessor’s order only made the termination of missions official, because
“even ardent Polish patriots had begun reporting “technical problems” preventing
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takeoff before he issued the order.” 39 By their conclusion the airdrops had provided
the Armia Krajowa with 1,344 small arms, 3,855 machine pistols, 380 light machine
guns, 237 bazookas, 13 mortars, 130 rifles, around 14,000 hand grenades, over
3,000 anti-tank grenades, over 4,500,000 rounds of ammunition, 8.5 tons of plastic
explosives and 45 tons of food.40
Harriman was aware that despite the Polish special duties flights, the Poles
were losing ground, “including the west-central district of Wole and Theatre Square,
in the heart of the city,”41 to the better equipped Germans and “faced total
extermination, unless immediate and large scale aid was received.”42 Accordingly, he
sent a letter to Molotov seeking immediate approval for American bombers to land
in Ukraine. Starting in England the bombers would drop arms to the partisans in
Warsaw, and then proceed to bomb nearby German airfields before finally landing
in Ukraine. 43 Andrei Vishinsky, Deputy Foreign Minister, responded to Harriman’s
request by declaring that the Soviets would not allow for the planes to land at the
Poltava base in Ukraine. Vishinsky claimed if they did, questions may be raised as to
whether the Russians really did not have anything to do with the “purely
adventuristic affair [Warsaw Uprising].” Harriman met with Vishinsky the very next
39
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day, reminding him that if the Russians revoked their assurance of aid to the Poles it
would have stern repercussions in London and Washington, but to Harriman’s
despair Vishinsky would not budge. The Soviet refusal led American politicians to
express concern over their attitude. Fearing that if the Russians were not checked,
things would spiral out of control, Harriman called Washington to challenge Stalin.
Harriman claimed if Washington allowed the Soviet Government to continue to
utilize its current policies, “the belief of the American public in the chances of
success in postwar cooperation would be profoundly shaken.” 44 When confronted,
the Russians responded by threatening to retract the U.S’s ability to utilize the three
air-shuttle bases in Ukraine, but Harriman was not daunted. The scare tactic
worked on Washington, however, as Harriman was told to ease up for fear of
jeopardizing continued use of the bases. Nevertheless, he did advise President
Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull that “we [America] should in our longterm relationship with the Russians, impose our views on them as firmly as possible
and show our displeasure whenever they take action of which we strongly
disapprove.”45
Harriman may have had strong private feelings on how to handle Russia’s
lack of cooperation, but in view of the sensitivity of the issue he put forth a very
different front in the public sphere. He declared that the “alliance between the U.S.A.
and the U.S.S.R. is firm and is expected to endure for decades” and that there “will be
no serious trouble between the Soviet Union and the United States on the Polish
44
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problems.”46 Roosevelt, aware that the “Poles would play a significant role in the
election”47 tried to divert attention away from Polish issues, asserting that they
were complex matters. “I suppose I know as much about that particular thing as any
American, and I don’t know enough to talk about it.”48 Dewey attacked Roosevelt’s
passive stance, claiming he was employing “personal secret diplomacy” that was
costing Poland.49 One of the reasons among others that Roosevelt had to utilize
“secret diplomacy” was because the American public may not have supported his
policy of favoring Russians over the Poles.
Stalin, though aware of how the political situation in America could “vitally
affect them [Russia] and their relationship with the United States” if Dewey and the
“reactionary and isolationists around him” were to be elected, still refused to budge
on a joint-appeal that Roosevelt and Churchill made on August 20. “We hope that
you will drop immediate supplies and munitions to the Poles of Warsaw, or will
agree to help our planes in doing it very quickly?”50 Stalin disregarded the appeal.51
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Instead, he criticized the “handful of power-seeking criminals”52 that had convinced
the citizens of Warsaw to partake in an uprising they had no hope of winning, and as
a result of their actions, the Red Army must fight off German counterattacks on the
east bank of Vistula before it can liberate Warsaw. 53 Moscow’s Communist party
newspaper, Pravda, called the uprising a political maneuver employed by the Polish
government-in-exile to “make propaganda and strengthen its prestige in the United
States and England.”54 Shortly afterward, Michal Rola- Zymierski, Commander-inChief of the Polish Army fighting alongside the Russians, reiterated the Pravda’s
assertion by declaring that the Warsaw uprising was “a thoughtless act
uncoordinated with the Red Army and apparently had the political motive to
enhance Mikolajczyk’s position.”55
Feeling that the tide was turning against them, the Polish government-inexile, sought backing from the United States and Great Britain.56 On 29 August,
these western allies answered the call granting combatant rights to the AK: ‘The
Polish Home Army, which is now mobilized, constitutes a combatant force, forming
an integral part of the Polish Armed Forces.”57 On 9 September, the British
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Government extended the combatant rights to Warsaw citizens as well. These two
declarations were of the utmost importance, because they assured General BórKomorowski and Colonel Chruściel that if the AK surrendered; the United States and
England would do their best to ensure the partisans would be treated as POWs and
not executed.
Unclear of the future but still wanting to reach a resolution, the Polish
Government submitted to Moscow a proposal on 30 August, which was already
approved by the Polish Underground, for the establishment of the new government.
The proposal called for:
“The immediate takeover of the administration of the
liberated Polish Lands. All foreign troops are to be removed
following the cessation of hostilities. Elections based on
universal, equal, direct, secret and proportional suffrage to
occur as soon as normal conditions are established in the
country. Until the implementation of the Constitutional
assembly following the elections, a National Council, composed
of an equal number of representatives from the five political
parties, will be appointed to assist the Government as an
advisory body. The Government will bring about an agreement
with the Soviet Government to jointly prosecute Germany and

by doing so the hope is to form a long-term relationship
between itself and the Soviet Union.”58
Stalin’s decision on whether the proposal was acceptable, served as a touchstone in
Polish-Russian relations. If he accepted the proposition, it would mark the end of
the long-running dispute. On the other hand, if Stalin denied the proposal, Premier
Mikolajczyk and the London Government would be at the mercy of the Soviets and
their Lublin Committee. The most controversial part of the proposal was that
restructuring of the Polish government in 1944 would based on the 1935
Constitution, and not the 1921 Constitution that the National Committee delegations
were pushing for.
In early August during a series of meetings with members of the Polish
Committee of Liberation, Mikolajczyk was presented with a proposition that the
Constitution of 1921 should act as the foundation of the new Polish government.
Mikolajczyk would be given the position of Premier in an effort to appease the
London government, but fourteen of the eighteen positions available were to be
filled by members of the National Committee. The proposal was rejected, because
when the Constitution was originally in place the Polish government was unable to
maintain order or prevent corruption, as it allocated too much power to the
legislature at the expense of the executive. This lack of control led to a coup d’état in
1926, resulting in a modification of the Constitution to strengthen the executive
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branch.59 Attempting to reach common ground, Mikolajcyzk countered the
Committee, proposing that they keep the President and build a Cabinet around the
four recognized democratic parties, “eliminating the Sanacja party, as well as the
Workers Party and possibly the Communists.”60 Bolesław Bierut, leader in the
Polish Committee of Liberation, claimed Mikolajczyk’s inclusion of all the parties
was not necessary since “political parties were a thing of the past.”61
As the first attempt to reach a resolution did not pan out, the London
Government put forth the proposal on 30 August formulated around the 1935
Constitution. Justifying the inclusion of the 1935 Constitution on the fact that if it
“were nullified, it would also void all laws concluded or promulgated by the Polish
Government after that date, including the Atlantic Charter and the UNRRA
convention.”62 Ultimately, Stalin felt that the proposal would not establish a
government that was both independent and favorable to the Russian government.
Stalin knew if he stood firm he could obtain a Polish government that was
friendly to the Russian cause, because the Polish Government was continually losing
“bargaining power,” as the situation in Warsaw was deteriorating rapidly. As John
Ward reported in The Times, conditions were appalling:
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“On every conceivable little piece of ground are
graves of civilians and soldiers. Worst of all, however, is the
smell of rotting bodies, which pervades over the whole center
of the city. Thousands of people are buried under the
ruins…Soldiers defending their battered barricades are an
awful sight. Mostly they are dirty, hungry and ragged. There
are very few who have not received some sort of wound. And
on and on, through a city of ruins, suffering and dead.”63
The citizens were physically and morally devastated when the struggling partisans
lost control of the Old Town and Powiśle, in late August. To many the loss of Old
Town on 2 September symbolized the inevitable failure of the uprising. The fall of
Powiśle meant the one power station was lost, leaving citizens without power after
4 September.64
With Armia Krajowa losing ground, the Poles only hope rested in the power
of the United States and Britain to pressure Russian officials. There were a couple of
reasons to be skeptical that the western allies would come through. Roosevelt felt it
was not in the allies’ best interest to pressure Stalin for fear of losing a strong
military ally. On 25 August, Churchill constructed a telegram intended for Stalin,
pertaining to American planes making an airdrop over Warsaw. Churchill asked
bluntly: “Why should they not land on the refueling ground which has been assigned
to us behind the Russian lines without inquiry as to what they have done on the
63
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way?”65 When asked if he would provide his support for the telegram, Roosevelt
replied by saying that “he was not willing to join Churchill in such a bold statement:
“I do not consider it advantageous to the long range general war prospect for me to
join with you in the proposed message.”66 Roosevelt realized from the numerous
conferences discussing post-war peace agreement that the world was going to be
divided into spheres of influence among the allies. Consequently, he did not want to
upset the current power balance between the western allies and Russia, afraid it
may result in a threat to the United States’ post-war national security. Not deterred,
Churchill sought out other means to pressure the Russians, including notifying
Molotov how the British public had began to question why the Soviets were doing
nothing to help the Poles in Warsaw.67 Infuriated that none of his tactics had
worked, Churchill proposed ignoring the embargo and landing on the Soviet
airfields. Just as with the telegram, Roosevelt refused to back Churchill for fear it
would jeopardize the alliance.
In Roosevelt’s eyes, this alliance was crucial for the United States’ post-war
security. Solidifying international security was of particular short-term importance,
with the November elections looming. Many Americans felt that the U.S. needed to
help Russia and accept her policies because of the instrumental role the Red Army
would play in the wars against Germany and Japan. In line with the public,
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American officials wanted to work with the Soviet Union.68 Harriman attempted to
alter Washington’s attitude to a firm but friendly quid pro quo attitude towards
Russia because he was convinced that if America continued to employ the same
stance with the Soviet Union “there is every indication that the Soviet Union will
become a world bully wherever their interests are involved.”69 Harriman perceived
the way that the Russians were dealing with Poland as a prime example of how they
were willing to bully anyone in an attempt to obtain what they desired. Since
Harriman viewed pressure on Poland as equivalent to pressure on America, “he
offered an incontrovertible, even hyperbolic, argument for confrontation.”70 Even
still, Roosevelt was unwilling to place any added pressure on Stalin. Truman,
though, would later formulate the United States policy around Harriman’s
conviction that Soviet control of Poland threatened vital U.S. interests.
In the end the additional pressure was not necessary as the Kremlin yielded
shortly after, “allowing allied planes to land on American airfields in the Soviet
Union provided that a plan of such operations will be submitted to the Soviet
authorities and will be agreed upon.”71 Recognizing that if they continued to refuse
to provide assistance international criticism would mount so Soviet planes started
airlifting supplies to the citizens of Warsaw starting 13 September. Regrettably the
majority of airdropped items fell into the areas controlled by the Germans since by
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that time they controlled most of the city. In total 589 planes flew 2,243 sorties and
spent 2,501 flight hours in the air over Warsaw.72
In helping the Armia Krajowa, Stalin recognized its existence and authority as
well as the Underground government. Mikolajczyk attempted to utilize this
newfound recognition to make one final effort to unify the National Committee of
Liberation and the Polish government in London. He hoped that removing two
individuals that persistently clashed with the Soviet Government, General
Soskowski and General Kukiel, Minister of War, of their duties the two sides could
reach an agreement.73 The only problem was that Edward B. Osubka-Morawski,
president of the National Committee, despised General Soskowski’s replacement,
General Bór-Komorowski, to the point that he sought to prosecute him for the
untimely Warsaw Uprising.74 It was clear the Russians were not going to make any
further efforts to work out a compromise, unless the Americans and British made
them.75 With that, all hope of the Red Army coming to the aid of the partisans was
lost. General Bór-Komorowski understood that despite his men’s most valiant
efforts, they would not be able to take control over the superior Germans without
the Russians. Therefore, on 28 August, General Bór-Komorowski had LieutenantColonel Zygmunt Dobrowolski of the Armia Krajowa meet with General von dem
72
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Bach to discuss possible options on how to proceed. General von dem Bach offered
four proposals:
“The recognition of combatant status for all AK male
and female fighters and officers would be allowed to keep their
personal arms; the International Red Cross would supervise
the surrender; and the civilian population would be evacuated
from Warsaw. If the AK wished to continue fighting, then the
Germans still wanted the evacuation of the civilian population,
after which ‘the fighting would be carried out with every
available means until the town and army were totally
destroyed.”76
Following a briefing by Lieutenant- Colonel Zygmunt Dobrowolski on the meeting,
Bór-Komorowski decided to plead to Stalin for assistance: “At this extreme hour of
need I appeal to you, Marshal, to issue orders for immediate operations which
would relieve the garrison of Warsaw and result in the liberation of the capital.”77
Stalin, by this time, had made the decision to no longer work with the Poles in
London. It may have made sense to cooperate with the “London émigrés during the
August talks with Mikolajczyk if he had accepted the Committee of Liberation’s
radical reforms,” but because he had not, it no longer did. 78 Concurrently,
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Mikolajczyk, held the Russians in contempt because they had “disarmed the Armia
Krajowa, arrested many of the officers and conscripted the men into the 1st Polish
Army in Soviet-occupied Poland.”79 Therefore, he sought to steer Poland away
“from the road, on which the Committee of Liberation” had introduced her and
install a Polish government composed of London émigrés that would work with the
western allies.80 Determined to prevent this from occurring, Stalin began
preparatory works to transform the Committee of Liberation into Poland’s
provisional government. Stalin, having officially decided to bypass the London
exiles in establishing the provisional Polish government, would no longer be
providing assistance to the partisans. With no substantial aid in the foreseeable
future the partisans tragically surrendered at 8 p.m. on 2 October. Bór-Komorowski
had been able to secure a peaceful agreement with Colonel Heller, in which the
soldiers of the Armia Krajowa were granted the rights of the Geneva Convention,
and soldiers and citizens alike were free from persecution.81
Victorious, the Germans ignored the peace settlement and deported 239,000
Warsaw citizens for labor in the Reich and occupied territory. 82 Those incapable of
working were left to fend for themselves. Seeking to help their fellow countrymen,
Poles from various neighboring villages placed peasant carts along the railway track
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for refugees seeking asylum. The peasants would then proceed to invite the exiles
into their homes.83 After overseeing the evacuation of Warsaw’s civilian population,
a total of 15,378 insurgents and 922 officers, including 3,000 women, who had been
part of the Armia Krajowa marched out of Warsaw as POWs.84 The men joined other
Polish POWs, but since the Germans had not dealt with women POWs before they
did not know how to handle them. “The women were sent to various camps in
Germany, usually adjacent to the men’s camps, but were forced to live in appalling
conditions, including living in tents rather than huts like the men.”85
In the aftermath of the Uprising between 200,000 to 250,000 men, women
and children, roughly a quarter of Warsaw’s population lay wounded or dead. Of the
approximate 40,000 individuals in the Armia Krajowa, 10,200 were killed, 7,000
were missing and presumed killed, and 5,000 were seriously wounded, making the
casualty rate over 50 percent. The Germans experienced a similar level of loss, with
10,000 being killed, 7,000 missing and presumed killed, and 9,000 wounded. 86
With Warsaw emptied out, the Germans stripped the buildings of anything
valuable. “Thousands of wagon-loads of furniture, carpets, pictures and clothing
were being dispatched into the Reich. All museums, libraries, collections, factory
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equipment, workshops and laboratories were transported to Germany.”87 Then the
Verbrennungs and Vernichtungskommando (Burning and Destruction Detachment)
began to destroy the capital. In a three month span the detachment destroyed
10,455 out of Warsaw’s 24,724 buildings. When describing the destruction Soviet
bomber pilot Alexandr Markov wrote: “We knew that Warsaw was once the most
beautiful capital in Europe. Now, when we flew over it we saw huge palls of smoke,
and even from the air we could smell burned flesh. My spine crawled to see so much
beauty transformed into ruins…all those golden bell towers gone.”88
Even though the uprising failed to free Warsaw from the grasp of the
Germans, it came to serve as a touchstone in relations between Russia and the
United States. Concerned with restoration of post-war peace among the allies,
Roosevelt did not want to alter the spheres of influence by taking a firm stance
against Russia’s policies. Harriman, annoyed with Washington’s soft stance against
Russia tried to alter it, but Roosevelt fearing the possible consequences would not
listen. When Truman took over the Presidency following Roosevelt’s death on April
12, 1945, Harriman saw his opportunity to re-shape Washington’s policies towards
Moscow.
Truman, anxious to prove that he was worthy of his new title, declared “we
[America] need to get tough with the Russians…we’ve got to teach them how to
behave,” after hearing Harriman say that Roosevelt’s lenient policy stance was born
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out of “fear of the Soviets.“89 Lacking Roosevelt’s poise or assurance, Truman
depended on guidance from James Byrne, Harry Hopkins and Harriman.90 Infuriated
with the Soviet’s inaction during the Warsaw uprising, Harriman portrayed the
Soviet Union’s domination of Poland as a threat to vital U.S. interests. Thus, the
United States was responsible for ensuring Poland’s freedom up to and past the
Curzon Line. “Or else Polish blood would stain American hands.” Truman,
reiterating what Harriman said, warned Molotov that America could not allow
Soviet control of Poland. Molotov, exhibiting patience towards the inexperienced
Truman, attempted to explain how the Big Three, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin,
had functioned. Not wanting to appear fearful of the Russians, Truman continually
cut off Molotov as he tried to discuss post-war restoration efforts. Ironically,
Harriman, who had employed the “fear” thesis to alter American officials stance
towards Russia, would later “regret that Truman went at it so hard because his
behavior gave Molotov an excuse to tell Stalin that the Roosevelt policy was being
abandoned…I think it was a mistake.”91 The strong-arm stance that Harriman
preached and Truman would come to utilize from that point on, resulted in the
formation of a slippery slope that ended with the Cold War.
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